Saray Ayala-Lopez

What could have we been, had we lived surrounded by a richer existential landscape? Work in social epistemology teaches us that a deficient number of collective conceptual resources can constitute injustice and is associated with a lack of intelligibility (for different subjects, and at both individual and collective levels) and communication problems. In particular, in the literature on hermeneutical injustice, researchers explore how insufficient resources can impede the (collective and/or individual) understanding of critical experiences. This impediment is said to constitute a form of (epistemic) injustice (Fricker 2007). The present work explores how deficient collective conceptual resources can prevent subjects not just from understanding but also from having critical experiences and building their identities in specific ways. Missing existential opportunities have to do with thoughts, desires, and experiences we could have had, which we never did, and which would have formed our identities differently. At least some of those missing existential opportunities constitute an injustice, a hybrid of epistemic and existential injustice, for a person is prevented from being what they could have been otherwise. Epistemic-existential injustice is caused by unjust power distribution, and it limits a person's experiential and existential landscape in a morally relevant way.

The activism we don’t appreciate: Your Honor Kent, my mother is a feminist and votes even if she doesn’t know she’s oppressed Resumen: Broncano mantiene que ocupar una situación de opresión no garantiza la lucidez necesaria para identificar la propia situación como injusta. Esta posición nos advierte que nos vamos a encontrar con casos de personas oprimidas que no tienen conocimiento sobre su situación de injusticia ni una actitud crítica hacia la misma. Lo que me interesa analizar en este comentario es cómo afecta esto a la agencia política de esas personas. La conclusión que quiero evitar es la siguiente: Cuando no escuchamos a alguien que está oprimida pero que no conoce su situación de opresión, no la estamos traicionando como agente política, no la estamos silenciando como posible activista. En este comentario propongo un análisis de las quejas que nos permite escapar de esa conclusión. Las quejas de muchas mujeres han de entenderse como acción política, una acción política que no está necesariamente acompañada de conocimiento sobre la injusticia que sufren. Una vez entendemos sus quejas como activismo, ya no podemos excluir a estas mujeres como sujetos políticos en la lucha contra el sexismo. Este análisis de las quejas nos lleva a concluir que estas mujeres sí que pueden ser traicionadas como agentes políticas, aunque no tengan conocimiento de su situación de injusticia. Las traicionamos cuando no entendemos sus quejas como resistencia. Abstract: Broncano thinks that being oppressed does not guarantee knowing that you are oppressed. This view warns us that we are going to find people who are oppressed and who don’t have knowledge about their oppression nor a critical attitude towards their situation. What concerns me here is how this view affects the political agency of those people. The conclusion I want to avoid is as follows: When we don’t listen to someone who is oppressed but who doesn’t know their position as oppressed, we are not betraying them qua a political agent, we are not silencing them as a potential activist. I propose an analysis of complains that allows us to escape that conclusion. I propose that the complains expressed by many women should be understood as a political action, one that is not necessarily accompanied by knowledge of the injustice they are suffering. Once we see their complains as activism, we cannot exclude these women from the fight against sexism and deny their political agency. Under this analysis, women can be betrayed qua political agents even when they don’t have knowledge of their unjust situation. We betray them when we don’t understand their complains as resistance. Palabras clave: Conocimiento, agencia política, activismo, resistencia, quejas. Keywords: Knowledge, political agency, activism, resistance, complains.

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals' preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together-synergistically-to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing.

In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a structural explanation that overcomes their unattractiveness. The main idea is that discursive injustice is not the result of biased interlocutors, but of problematic discursive norms.

The goal of this paper is to problematize the use of sex categories in medical contexts. We question the benefits of categorizing all individuals as either male or female in medical contexts and argue that we should focus instead on the relevant sex-related properties of patients. Contrary to what many people believe, the classificatory system by which sexed bodies are neatly divided into male and female is anything but clear. An abundance of evidence shows that a binary sex system does not accurately describe the reality of human bodies. Given the complexity of sex with its many markers, variations, and combinations, why is medicine still based on the assumption that there are only two sexes? Why is binary sex still systematically used as a proxy in medical contexts, even when it doesn't help, but can actually hinder diagnoses, care, and treatments? The complexity and heterogeneity of sexed bodies is critical in medical contexts. We argue that the use of female/male categories overlooks and obscures this complexity and variety, thereby resulting in a variety of harms, poor health care, oversimplification, and over-pathologization.