Abstract
Political scientists commonly use their courses to emphasize the
pervasive nature of collective action problems, whereby group interests
are undermined by individual incentives to “defect” or
“free ride.” In a graduate seminar a faculty member may have
students read classics in this area, such as Mancur Olson's The
Logic of Collective Action (1965). Graduate
students are often expected to model a collective action problem as a
prisoner's dilemma and be able to understand the implications in such
areas as establishment of interest groups, voting turnout, budgeting, and
military relationships among nations. Even in lower division undergraduate
courses political science instructors may integrate concepts from
collective action theory. This orientation is also evident in some
textbooks. Thus in their introduction to American politics, Samuel Kernell
and Gary C. Jacobson (2003) offer an extensive
discussion of collective action problems and the role of government, and
return repeatedly to this topic throughout their book. Similarly, a focus
on collective action problems is at the heart of Walter Stone's
introductory American politics text, Republic at Risk (1990).