Abstract
How does the anticipation of external support for both opposition groups and governments affect the likelihood and form (violent vs. nonviolent) of uprising within states? We develop a novel approach to address these issues, building on a network perspective. Our model suggests that both opposition groups and governments’ strategies are affected by an anticipation of the degree and nature of expected support by external parties (states and non-state actors). Using a set of indicators – including cultural affinity, strategic factors, and normative values – we develop a unique measure of anticipated support based on the potential support networks of target states and their opposition in order to evaluate our hypotheses. We argue that the anticipated balance of support for opposition and governments affects: (a) the likelihood of uprising and (b) the principal – violent or nonviolent – strategy used by the opposition group. We analyze data on violent and nonviolent civil conflicts over the period 1946–2010. We find that when the balance of anticipated support favors the opposition over their target government, the onset of an uprising is more likely. Specifically, the type of anticipated support has implications for whether a violent or nonviolent uprising occurs. These findings provide new insights into the role external support can play even before conflict occurs.