Abstract
This thesis aims to examine how the United States and China resolve their political disputes. Specifically this thesis examines the idea that there is a relationship between the costs of coercion and both states’ decision to negotiate. Additionally, this thesis also seeks to examine the role of policy preferences at the start of political disputes and to model the negotiation process using the positional bargaining model. Sources of Data To examine the relationship between costs of coercion and the decision by United States and China to negotiate, this study examines three well-known disputes between the United States and China since normalization of relations. These cases are the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the 2001 Hainan Incident. Conclusions Reached The results from looking at these cases support the idea that there is a relationship between costs of coercion and the decision by United States and China to negotiate. Trade data indicates a growing economic trend of interdependence between the United States and China since 1985 in terms of trade volume. While no negotiations took place during the 1996 crisis, negotiations did take place in the crises that followed in subsequent years. It is suspected that the increase in trade provides an additional deterrent to pursing coercive policies. Negotiations in both the 1999 and 2001 incidents contained clearly observable outcome preferences at the start of negotiations and those preferences informed what was eventually negotiated over. The positional bargaining model also provides an adequate framework for understanding the tit-for-tat behavior exhibited in these negotiations as well.