Abstract
This study seeks to empirically investigate how member reelection behavior varies between professional, citizen, and hybrid legislatures in states that have term limits. By accounting for the level of professionalism, we will be able to test whether or not the opportunity structure predicts the reelection behavior of members. The central thesis is that careerist and springboard behavior will be most common in states that have favorable opportunity structures, least common in states that have poor opportunity structures, and moderately common in states that have mid-level opportunity structures. However, the level of legislative professionalization will work to either strengthen or weaken these relationships, with highly professionalized legislatures producing more careerist behavior and citizen legislatures producing less careerist behavior. Sources of Data I selected a cohort from the Ohio, South Dakota, and Arizona State House Representatives who began their service in 1993 and traced that cohort over time. These states were chosen because each one represents a different level of professionalism. They were also chosen because they all enacted term limits in 1992, have four, two-year terms in the state House of Representatives, same year of impact (2000), and had consecutive term limit bans. Background research was conducted for each person to discover past political experience, how many terms served in the lower house, political or professional experience after terms served, and current position in the legislature or private sector. Conclusions Reached Careerist and springboard behavior was most common in Ohio because of the state’s favorable opportunity structures, least common in South Dakota because of the state’s poor opportunity structures, and moderately common in Arizona because of the state’s mid-level opportunity structures. Although South Dakota did not have a favorable opportunity structure, some members exhibited springboard and careerists behavior.