Abstract
Ethiopia takes pride in a long history of peaceful coexistence among three
Abrahamic religions that are locked in violent contentions elsewhere. However,
these apparently amicable religious relations in Ethiopia gave way to monumental religious struggles following the 1974 socialist revolution and a declared
separation of church and state. The religious struggle in Ethiopia became publicly more visible since 1991, following the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front’s (EPRDF ) violent takeover of the then-national government
of military socialism and subsequent declaration of ‘religious freedom.’1
Although this phenomenon has not attracted the magnitude of attention it
deserves, it has been the subject of limited but engaging inquiries (Abbink 2011;
Ahmed 2006; Erlich 2010; Feyissa 2013; Fantini 2015; Ostebo 2007; to name
but few).2 Of special relevance for the analysis that follows is how the noted
works situate religious contestations in the larger context of worldly concerns,
specifically how they examine religion in relation to questions of culture and
identity politics, practices of power, and struggles over historically entrenched
structures of inequality. Among other things, the previous works highlight that
religion runs the gamut of the entire history of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa
at large. For much of the conflict-ridden history of this region, the fates of religious institutions closely mirrored fortunes and misfortunes of political regimes.
As shown in Chapter 2, political regimes in Ethiopia have undergone radical
transformations since the 1970s. This has had profound impact on religious institutions and associated identities.
An important background to the discussion in this chapter is a contested
national history in which Ethiopia’s monarchic regimes maintained a relationship of exclusive mutuality with the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church
(EOTC). That is, prior to 1974 socialist revoution, an exclusive coupling of the
Ethiopian state and EOTC meant that all other faiths did not have equal status.
Even the self-proclaimed modern Ethiopian constitution of 1955 explicitly
stated that Orthodox Christianity was the state religion. Article 126 of the 1955
Ethiopian constitutions reads: “The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, founded in the
fourth century, on the doctrine of Saint Mark, is the established Church of the
Empire and is, as such, supported by the state. The Emperor shall always
profess the Ethiopian Orthodox Faith.” Thus, along with the slogan of ‘land to
the tiller’ (see Chapter 5), the 1960s student movement also shouted, ‘equality
of religion.’
When the Ethiopian socialist regime (1974-1991) declared, in one of its
sweeping degrees, separation of state and church, it legally ended the Ethiopian
Orthodox Church’s supreme status. On paper this promised to end statesponsored marginalization, stigmatization, and official rejection of other faiths.
Although the way socialism was practiced in Ethiopia had its peculiarities, it
shared some common traits with socialist practices elsewhere (Donham 1999).
Specifically, the Ethiopian socialist state subscribed to Marxist ideology and
rejected religion (at least some form of it) as superstition as well as deemed it an
institution of exploitation. However, the socialist state’s suppression of religious
freedom or persecution of religious leaders did not apply equally to all religions
in Ethiopia. The historically powerful Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church,
although lost much of its former unchallenged monopoly over all matters of
faith, weathered socialist secularism better than other religious institutions. In
fact, as Ancel and Ficquet (2015) note, the Ethiopian socialist government did
not attempt to stamp out the Orthodox Church. Instead, the socialist state leaned
on EOTC to spread its ideology and control the rural population. Ancel and
Ficquet wrote: “… the [EOTC] patriarchate launched a series of seminars
throughout all dioceses to instruct the clergy and the faithful on the compatibility
between the principles of socialism and the Bible.” (2015, 78). As will be discussed, in some parts of the country the socialist state campaigned on behalf of
the Orthodox Church encouraging the local population to convert to Orthodox
Christianity (Yoshida 2010). Compared to all previous regimes, the Ethiopian
socialist state was also less hostile to Islam, which had often been viewed as a
potential threat to national security (Erlich 2010).
The socialist state’s anti-religion policy hit indigenous religion the hardest.
For example, in Kaffa, a notable former southern kingdom where indigenous
religion loomed large, Yoshida (2010) reports that in 1975 the Derg (Ethiopian
socialist government) executed many prominent Alamos (spirit mediums),
burned down their homes, and forced the Manğo people (cultural minority
described in Chapter 3) to convert to Orthodox Christianity. This was not an isolated experience but a pattern observed across several localities. In other
southern Ethiopian societies such as Dawro and Wolaita, my informants confirmed that the Derg’s persecution of spirit mediums and demonization of indigenous religion triggered increased conversion to Evangelical Christianity
especially during the early socialist period. Although Evangelical Christians
enjoyed an unprecedented sense of religious freedom during the formative years
of the socialist regime, the Evangelical honeymoon with the Derg was shortlived. Once the Derg officially aligned with the Soviet Union and swore to
follow the Marxist-Leninist ideology, Evangelical Christianity was reclassified
as a pro-Western, imperialist, and anti-revolutionary religion and its followers
were subjected to an extended period of persecution (Eshete 2009). At this point,
Evangelical Christians’ right to practice their faith, like that of indigenous religious leaders, was routinely violated by the socialist state.